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The Uncertainty Surrounding Grazing and Section 401 of 
the Clean Water Act: Predicting the Outcome of Oregon 
Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In July of 1998, the Ninth Circuit released an opinion in Oregon Natu-
ral Desert Association (ONDA) v. Dombeck,1 which held that state certifi-
cation under section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA) is required for 
point sources of pollution, but not required for nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion. The decision surprised commentators who had predicted an opposite 
result. 2 Then in October of 1998, the Ninth Circuit withdrew the earlier 
opinion,3 which left the litigants, the state of Oregon and other interested 
parties wondering what the final outcome would be. This case note dis-
cusses why the court should rely on their first impression of the case and 
reinstate their earlier decision. The note also discusses the implications 
such a decision would have on water quality and land use on Federal 
lands. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Water Quality Improvement Ad 
(WQIA) which attempted to control water pollution. These attempts were 
mostly unsuccessful because WQIA contained two major flaws. First, reg-
ulators had to work back upstream to discover the source of pollution. On 
a stream with multiple dischargers it was very difficult to determine and 
prove which discharger or combination of dischargers was causing water 
quality to fall below the quality standards.5 Second, WQIA allowed dis-
chargers to freely to pollute a water body until the pollutants in the water 
* Copyright© 1999 by Daryl G. Ward. 
I. No. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9'" Cir.). 
2. Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 201 (1996); Dana G. Leonard, Pud1, Thomas, and the Future of Section 401 of the Clean 
Water Act: An Expansion of State Regulation, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 293 ( 1998); Alia 
S. Miles, Comment, Searching for the D~finition of' "Discharge": Section 401 of' the Clean Water 
Act, 28 ENVTL. L. 191 (1998). 
3. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *I. 
4. Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (1970). 
5. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *4. 
391 
392 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
reached the threshold of the water quality standards.6 Thus, dischargers did 
not have adequate incentives to implement expensive pollution reducing 
techniques. 
B. The 1972 Amendments and Technology Based Effluent Standards 
Congress recognized these flaws and amended the WQIA in 1972. 
These broad amendments became known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).7 
The new legislation changed the focus of the law by concentrating on re-
ducing the amount of pollution discharged, regardless of the condition of 
the water body in which the pollution was dumped. Discharges of pollut-
ants where outlawed unless the discharger obtained a permit under the Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).8 
The Act directed the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to establish NPDES permit limits based on the available pollution 
reducing technology. 9 These technology standards took into consideration 
factors such as: age of machinery, processes employed, cost of achieving 
the effluent guideline, and other environmental impacts. 10 Thus, a NPDES 
permit requires the discharger to reduce pollutants in their discharge to an 
amount the EPA decided was technically feasible for the industry. As a 
safety net, section 303 was enacted, which imposed water quality stan-
dards if the technology-based standards failed to achieve the water quality 
necessary to sustain the designated use for that particular water body. 11 
The NPDES permits were only required for "point sources," which are 
defined by the CW A as "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, 
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding oper-
ation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged."12 Discharges of pollutants that do not fit into this category 
have become classified as nonpoint sources. These nonpoint sources of 
pollutants are not directly regulated by the 1972 amendments. Congress 
presumably took this course of action because point source polluters could 
be identified and regulated more easily than nonpoint source polluters. 13 
6. See id. 
7. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
8. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). 
9. The CW A provides for several technology based standards including: Best Practicable 
Technology (BPT), 33 U.S.C. § 13ll(b)(l) (1994); Best Conventional Control (BCT). 33 U.S C. 
§ 1314(a)(4) (1996); Best Available Technology (BAT), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2) (1994). For a 
detailed discussion of these standards see ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION, LAW SCIENCE, AND POLICY, 916-30 (2d ed. 1996). 
I 0. See supra note 8. 
II. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). 
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). 
13. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *4 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 
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The 1972 amendments did enact some indirect regulation of nonpoint 
sources. 14 Section 208 provided grants for the construction of municipal 
waste treatment plants. States that participated were required to prepare 
wastewater treatment plans that included procedures for the identification 
and control of nonpoint source pollution. 15 "Thus, the Act provides nodi-
rect mechanism to control nonpoint source pollution but rather uses the 
'threat and promise' of federal grants to the states to accomplish this 
task."16 This indirect regulation of nonpoint source pollution was supple-
mented in 1987 when Congress added section 319 to the Act. 17 Under sec-
tion 319, states were required to adopt nonpoint source management pro-
grams and also provides grants to implement the programs. 18 
C. Section 401 of the CWA 
The purpose of section 401 is to ensure that activities requiring a Fed 
eral permit or licence will not cause pollution in violation of state water 
quality standards. The language of section 401 provides: 
Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to conduct any activ-
ity ... which may result in any discharge into the navigable wa-
ters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency a certification 
from the State in which the discharge originates ... that any such 
discharge will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 
1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title .... No license or 
permit shall be granted until the certification required by this sec-
tion has been obtained or has been waived .... 19 
Historically, states have exercised their certification authority only for hy-
droelectric projects, discharges that required a 404 permit, and other point 
sources. 20 
D. PUD No. 1 v. Washington 
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't 
of Ecology,21 which interpreted section 401. This case involved a proposed 
F.2d 1314, 1316 (9'h Cir. 1990). 
14. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329 (1994). 
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1994). 
16. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *4 (quoting Shanty Town Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. EPA, 
843 F.2d 782, 791 (4'h Cir. 1988)). 
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994). 
18. /d.; See also Natural Resource Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1318 (9'h Cir. 
1990). 
19. 33 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(l) (1994). 
20. Miles, supra note 2, at 192. 
21. 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
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hydroelectric dam which included two point source discharges: the release 
of dredge and fill materials during the construction of the dam, and the 
release of water through the dam's tailrace. The Washington Department 
of Ecology placed a limitation in the 401 permit for minimum instream 
flows, which are considered a nonpoint source. The Supreme Court upheld 
these minimum instream flow requirements, even though the decrease of 
instream flows was not related to the point sources. 22 This expansive view 
of section 401 kindled curiosity about the potential power of section 401. 23 
PUD No. 1, however, failed to answer whether state certification is needed 
for an activity requiring a Federal licence or permit which exclusively 
causes nonpoint source pollution. 
E. The Split of Authority in the Ninth Circuit 
After the ruling in PUD No. 1, various groups filed lawsuits attempt-
ing to establish that section 401 applied to activities only causing nonpoint 
source pollution. In 1996, two district courts in the Ninth Circuit reached 
opposite conclusions on this issue. 
The first case, Idaho Conservation League v. Caswel/,24 involved a 
logging road that would potentially increase the sediment load in a nearby 
stream. Idaho Conservation League (ICL), as part of its claim, sought to 
enjoin the construction of the road because the U.S. Forest Service had not 
required certification under section 401 for the project. 25 The Idaho Dis-
trict Court held that the logging road was a nonpoint source of pollution 
and section 401 was "only intended to encompass those projects which 
resulted in a 'point source discharge.' "26 
III. FACTS 
The second case, the subject of this case note, was Oregon Natural 
Desert Association v. Thomas. 27 Oregon Natural Desert Association filed 
an action challenging the Forest Service's long-time practice of issuing 
grazing permits without requiring permittees to first obtain state water 
quality certification. 28 The grazing permit in question had been issued in 
22. See id. 
23. See Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 40/, 23 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 201 (1996). 
24. No. CV 95-394-S-MHW, 1996 WL 938215 (D. Idaho, Aug. 12, 1996). 
25. /d. at *8. 
26. /d. at *9. 
27. 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). 
28. !d. at 1537. 
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1993 to Robert and Diana Burri! and allowed them to graze 50 head of 
cattle in Oregon's Malheur National Forest. "The cattle graze several 
months a year in and around Camp Creek and the Middle Fork of the John 
Day River."29 The parties stipulated that the grazing cattle could poten-
tially pollute these waterways with their waste, increased sedimentation, 
and increased temperature. 30 Other parties intervened to defend their posi-
tions on this important issue. 31 
The district court granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, 
concluding that "discharge" as used in section 401 applied to both point 
and nonpoint sources of pollution.32 
After debate between the EPA, the Forest Service and the Bureau of 
Land Management, the ruling was appealed. 33 On July 22, 1998, the Ninth 
Circuit reversed the district court and held that "certification under [sec-
tion 401] is not required for grazing permits or other Federal licenses that 
may cause pollution solely from nonpoint sources."34 Then, in October, 
1998, the Ninth Circuit withdrew their initial decision. 
IV. REASONING 
In the initial opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's 
ruling concerning section 401 's application to nonpoint sources. The court 
came to this conclusion after examining "the language of the governing 
statute, guided not by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
look[ing] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and pol-
icy."35 The court relied on the following factors in their decision. 
A. 1972 Amendments Changed the Focus of the Clean Water Act 
The predecessor of the Clean Water Act, the 1970 Water and Environ-
mental Quality Improvement Act (WEQI), "attempted to control water pol-
lution by focusing regulatory efforts on achieving 'water quality stan-
dards,' standards set by the states specifying the tolerable degree of pollu-
tion for particular waters."36 Enforcers of WEQI had a difficult task of de-
29. ONDA. 1998 WL 407711 at *I. 
30. 940 F. Supp at 1537. 
31. The Burrils, Grant County, and the Eastern Oregon Public Lands Coalition intervened as 
defendants and the Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation intervened as plaintiffs. 
ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *I. 
32. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *7. 
33. See Miles, supra note 2, at 193. 
34. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *7. 
35. /d.at *3 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 
u.s 86, 94-95 (1993)). 
36. !d. at *4 (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 915 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9'h 
Cir. 1990) (citing EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03 (1976)). 
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termining and proving which discharger, among all the dischargers on the 
stream, caused the water quality to fall below acceptable standards.37 Addi-
tionally, the program was flawed because it focused on "the tolerable ef-
fects rather than the preventable causes."38 
The 1972 Clean Water Act changed the focus of controlling national 
water pollution. Congress directed the EPA to set effluent limitations for 
point source dischargers. Instead of basing these effluent limitations on the 
condition of the water receiving the pollution, the limitations were based 
on the best technical pollution elimination methods available to the dis-
charger. Thus, the CW A banned discharges from point sources, unless the 
discharger obtained a NPDES permit and met the effluent guidelines. 
B. The Act's Separate Treatment of Point and Nonpoint Sources of 
Pollution 
The overall goal of the amendment was to eliminate discharges from 
point sources.39 As discussed above in the background section, the CW A 
directly regulates point source pollution and only indirectly regulates non 
point source pollution.40 The Ninth Circuit recognized this distinction in 
Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Service. 41 Us-
ing CWA's citizen suit provision,42 Oregon Natural Resources Council 
(ONRC) attempted to enjoin a logging operation that was causing non 
point source pollution. Under CW A, a citizen can sue if section 1311 ef-
fluent limitations are violated.43 ONRC argued that the effluent limitations 
of section 1311 applied to nonpoint sources by virtue of section 
1311(b)(l)(C), which referenced state water quality standards. This argu-
ment was rejected by the court because it was contrary to the structure and 
plain language of the Act: "The title and construction of section 
1311 (b )(1) lead us to the logical conclusion that the 'limitations' set forth 
in section 131l(b)(l)(C) are 'effluent limitations' and, therefore, by defini-
tion, applicable only to point sources."44 The court used the same reason-
ing to reach the conclusion that "discharge" as used in section 401 only 
included point sources.45 
37. /d. 
38. /d. 
39. 33 U.S.C. § 125l(a) (1994). 
40. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text. 
41. 834 F.2d 842 (9'" Cir. 1987). 
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). 
43. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f)(2) (1994). 
44. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United States Forest Serv .. 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9'" 
Cir. 1987). 
45. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *7. 
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C. The Amendment of§ 401 
The language of section 401 was amended in 1972. Prior to 1972, the 
provision allowed states to certify that a licensed activity would "not vio-
late applicable water quality standards."46 After 1972, section 401 required 
certification that any discharge from the licensed activity "will comply 
with the applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 
1317'' of Title 33.47 Each one of these sections regulates point source dis-
charges. 
The court recognized that the language of section 401 was changed "to 
assure consistency with the bill's changed emphasis from water quality 
standards to effluent limitations based on the elimination of any discharge 
of pollutants."48 
D. CWA 's Use of the Word "Discharge" 
The outcome of ONDA v. Dombeck hinges on the interpretation of the 
term "discharge" as used in section 401. 
1. Discharge v. discharge of pollutants 
The plaintiff argued that" 'discharge' in [Section 401] refers to pollu-
tion from both point sources and nonpoint sources."49 Section 502 of the 
CW A defines "discharge" and "discharge of pollutants" as follows: 
"The term 'discharge of a pollutant' ... means any addition of any pollut-
ant to navigable waters from any point source .... "50 "The term 'dis-
charge' when used without qualification includes a discharge of a 
pollutant .... "51 
Therefore, the term "discharge" when used without qualification in-
cludes any addition of any pollutant to navigable water from any point 
source. The term "includes," is expansive, and the plaintiff argued that 
"discharge" must include more than point source releases. Because non 
point pollution is the only other category of pollution, discharge must in-
clude non point source pollution. This was the basis of the district court's 
ruling that "discharge" must include releases from point and nonpoint 
sources. 52 
46. Pub. L. 91-224. § 21(b)(1). 84 Stat. 91 (1970). 
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l) (1994). 
48. S.Rep. No. 414, at 69 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N., 3735. 
49. ONDA. 1998 WL 407711 at *3. 
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1994). 
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (1994) (emphasis added). 
52. ONDA, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1539-40 (D. Or. 1996). 
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The Ninth Circuit recognized the expansiveness of the term "in-
cludes," but rejected the conclusion that discharge included nonpoint 
sources. Instead, the court embraced the government's position that" 'dis-
charge' is limited to point sources but includes both polluting and 
nonpolluting releases. "53 
2. Runoffv. discharge 
The court also found that "[t]he terminology employed throughout the 
Clean Water Act cuts against ONDA's argument that the term 'discharge' 
includes non point source pollution like runoff from grazing. "54 The court 
recognized that the word "discharge" is used consistently throughout the 
act, in reference to the release of effluent from a point source. 55 By con-
trast, the term "runoff" is used to describe pollution flowing from nonpoint 
sources. 56 The court reasoned that Congress would have included runoff in 
section 401 if they had intended to require certification for runoff as well 
as discharges.57 This reasoning was based on the language used by Con-
gress in section 313 "which directs federal agencies 'engaged in any activ-
ity which may result in the discharge or runoff of pollutants' to comply 
with applicable water quality standards."58 The court concluded that "(h]ad 
Congress intended to require certification for runoff as well as discharges, 
it could easily have written [section 401] to mirror the language of (section 
313]."59 
E. Distinguishing PUD No. 1 v. Washington Dep't of Ecology 
The appellees argued that the holding in PUD No. 1 v. Washington 
Dep't of Ecologl0 dictated the District Court's ruling. The Ninth Circuit, 
however, distinguished PUD No. 1 because the permit in question there 
had discharges from point sources as well as nonpoint sources. The point 
source discharges were a release of dredge and fill materials during con-
struction of a hydroelectric dam and the release of water through the dam's 
tailrace. PUD No. 1 held that "a state is free to impose such water-quality 
limitations 'once the threshold condition, the existence of a discharge, is 
53. 1998 WL 407711 *3; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982) (interpreting "discharge" in section 1362(16) of the Act to include the release from a 
point source of turbid water that did not contain any pollutant). 
54. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *6. 
55. See id. 
56. See 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1994) (describing urban wastewater plans); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(!) 
(1994) (providing guidelines for identification of nonpoint sources of pollution). 
57. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *6. 
58. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *6 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994)) (emphasis added). 
59. !d. 
60. 511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
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satisfied.' "61 ONDA did not reach the threshold condition of having point 
source discharges. 
V. ANALYSIS 
Before discussing whether section 401 should apply to nonpoint 
source pollution, a brief description of nonpoint sources and their effect on 
the environment will be helpful. 
A. Nonpoint Source Pollution 
1. What sources are considered nonpoint? 
Understanding what nonpoint sources are requires comprehension of 
the definition of point sources. The CW A defines a point source as: "any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but no limited to 
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation,62 or vessel or other 
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged."63 
Nonpoint sources, however, have not been defined by the Clean Water Act 
or subsequent regulation.64 "[Nonpoint source pollution] remains a de 
facto residual category encompassing any source of water pollution that is 
not regulated as a point source, either because it is not considered to be a 
discrete conveyance, or because it has been statutorily excluded from the 
definition."65 
Uncertainty remains in the classification of point and nonpoint 
sources. Runoff is normally considered a nonpoint source pollution, but 
once it has been collected and discharged from a discrete point, like a 
storm drain system, it becomes a point source.66 
The Confederate Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation argued that 
the grazing of cattle is "sufficiently similar" to point source pollution to 
require its inclusion in the definition of the term "discharge."67 The basis 
for this argument is that humans confined cattle to these areas, thereby 
61. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *6 (quoting PUD No. I v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 
511 us 700,712 (1994)). 
62. The Confederate Tribes, an Intervener/ Appellee, argued that the grazing operation may 
constitute a "concentrated animal feeding operation" under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). The Ninth 
Circuit held that "[t]his position is not tenable" because the requirements of the controlling regulation 
where not met. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *7. 
63. 33 US.C. § 1362(14) (1994). 
64. JACKSON B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: WATER POLLUTION 
419 (2d ed. 1993). 
65. /d. "[A]gricultural stormwater discharges" and "return flows from irrigated agriculture" 
are specifically exempted from the definition of point source. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994). 
66. See Miles, supra note 2, at 197-98. 
67. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *7. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. /d. See supra 
note 62 and accompanying text. 
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causing feces, urine and sediment to directly enter navigable waters. This 
pollution is more similar to a direct discharge than runoff. The court flatly 
rejected this argument by agreeing "with the Second Circuit that the term 
'point source' does not include a human being, or any other animal."68 The 
court stated "[i]t would be strange indeed to classify as a point source 
something as inherently mobile as a cow."69 
2. Sources ofnonpoint source pollution on federal lands 
Nonpoint sources are the leading causes of water quality impairment 
for rivers and lakes.70 In 1994, the EPA listed several types of nonpoint 
pollution sources among the leading five types of water quality impair-
ment.71 Agriculture, hydriodic/habitat modification, and resource extrac-
tion were included as some of the top contributors of non point source pol-
lution.72 Many of the activities on Federal land that require a permit, like 
grazing, timber harvesting, and mining, fit within these categories. 73 
Agriculture, which includes grazing, is the leading source of human 
related water quality impairment in the nations rivers and lakes. "[It] gen-
erates pollutants that degrade aquatic life or interfere with public use of 
134, 557 river miles (which equals 60% of the impaired river miles) in 49 
States and Tribes."74 Grazing, which is a major source of agricultural non-
point pollution, is damaging because cattle tend to congregate in riparian 
zones. A healthy riparian buffers the stream from pollution by providing: 
(1) [S]tream bank stabilization and erosion control that reduces 
bioload sediment, (2) filtering and entrapment of sediments and 
silt, (3) stability against stream damage by high-flow events, (4) 
ground-water recharge through absorption, (5) shade to maintain 
stream temperatures suitable for aquatic resource, (6) organic de-
bris that enters the aquatic food chain, and (7) overhanging bank 
cover from tree roots and shrubs that provide cover and terrestrial 
insect food for fish. 75 
68. /d. (citing United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643. 649 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
69. !d. 
70. National Water Quality Inventory (NWQI), 1994 Report to Congress, ES-14, ES-19. 
71. !d. at Table ES-4, ES-12. 
72. /d. 
73. !d. at 33-35. 
74. !d. at ES-14. 
75. Brian L. Frank, Cows in Hot Water: Regulation of Livestock Grazing Through the 
Federal Clean Water Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV.l269, 1272 (1995) (citing Richard H. Braun, 
Emerging Limits on Federal Land Management Discretion: Livestock, Riparian Ecosystems, and 
Clean Water Law, 17 ENVTL. L. 43, 46-47 (1986)). 
391] GRAZING & §401 o.F THE CLEAN WATER ACT 401 
Cattle destroy these vital riparian zones by trampling streambanks and re-
move stabilizing vegetation from the streambanks. The cattle also add pol-
lutants by defecating in and around the water. 
Timber harvesting causes nonpoint source pollution from harvesting, 
as well as from the construction of roads to gain access to the timber. The 
heavy equipment associated with timber harvesting disturbs the soil and 
damages the vegetation of the forest floor. This causes soil erosion, which 
increases the sediment load of nearby streams and lakes. Logging roads 
also accelerate soil erosion by funneling runoff and increasing its erosion 
power. 76 
Mining impairs water quality by increasing soil erosion and acid 
leaching from mine tailings. "[S]treams impacted by acid mine drainage 
are devoid of fish and other aquatic life due to low pH levels and the 
smothering effects of iron and other metals."77 Mining also disturbs the 
soil which increases sediment loads in nearby water bodies.78 
3. The effect ofnonpoint source pollution on the nation's waters 
Nonpoint sources "account for about half of the national pollution 
loads,"79 and "impair[] more water bodies, surface and ground, urban and 
rural, than any other pollution source in the country."80 Nonpoint sources 
add excessive nutrients, sediment, oxygen-depleting substances, and met-
als to the water. 81 Removal of stream side vegetation also increases the wa-
ter temperature. 82 These pollutants breach the integrity of the ecosystem, 
which causes fish to die and render the water unfit for drinking or other 
beneficial uses. 83 
It is important to remember that these pollutants are not directly depos-
ited into the stream but are carried in the runoff from land. Thus, habitat 
destruction and uses that disturb the soil cause nonpoint pollution. At the 
heart of the connection between nonpoint source pollution and compro-
76. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 182 ( 1993). 
77. NWQI at 34. 
78. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 181 (1993). 
79. Dana G. Leonard, Note, PUD 1, Thomas, and the Future of Section 401 of the Clean 
Water Act: An Expansion of State Regulation, 18 1. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 293, 298 ( 1998) 
(citing ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER 10-11 (1993); JACKSON 
B. BATTLE & MAXINE I. LIPELES, ENVIRONME:NTAL LAW: WATER POLLUTION 422 (2d ed. 1993)). 
80. ROBERT W. ALDER ET AL, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS LATER, 171 (1993). Mr. 
Alder uses "poison runoff" to describe nonpoint source pollution. 
81. NWQI at ES-7 to ES-ll. 
82. 1d. at ES-8. 
83. NWQI at 32. 
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mised water quality is a truth articulated by EPA: "[T]he health of rivers 
and streams is directly linked to habitat integrity on shore."84 Controlling 
nonpoint pollution will entail regulating land use. This will be politically 
unpopular and more difficult than regulating point source discharges. 85 
Upon discovery of the major impacts non point source pollution is hav-
ing on national water quality, one may be inclined to disagree with the 
court and approve of applying section 401 to nonpoint source pollution. 
This action seems to be a step in the right direction to curtailing this mas-
sive source of pollution. On reflection, however, there are reasons why 
interpreting section 401 in this manner is justifiable. 
B. Section 401 is Not the Right Tool to Fix the Problem of Nonpoint 
Source Pollution 
The Ninth Circuit's initial decision on ONDA v. Dombeck was correct 
for the following reasons. First and most importantly, Congress did not 
intend section 401 to apply to nonpoint source pollution.86 Second, con-
struing section 401 contrary to Congressional intent is likely to lead to il-
logical results.87 Third, many states lack resources and the incentives to 
implement a meaningful section 401 certification program.88 
1. Courts are not authorized to interpret a statute contrary to the intent 
of Congress 
When interpreting a statute, like section 401, courts are constrained by 
the language of the statute and the intent Congress placed on that lan-
guage.89 After the 1972 amendments of the CWA, the overall structure and 
language of the act make it unlikely that Congress envisioned the applica-
tion of section 401 to nonpoint sources of pollution. 
a. The language of the CWA shows Congress's intent 
Throughout the CW A, Congress used "discharge" and "runoff" to dis-
tinguish between point and nonpoint source pollution. To illustrate this 
point, consider section 313 which governs pollution from federal facili-
84. Miles, supra note 2, at 20 I (quoting National Water Quality Inventory, 1994 Report to 
Congress. p. ES-13). 
85. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Can it be Done" 
65 CHI.-KENT L. REV.479 (1989). 
86. See inf"ra notes 89-104. 
87. See inf"ra notes 105-109. 
88. See infra notes 110-116. 
89. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 94-95 
(1993) 
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ties. 90 This section "directs federal agencies 'engaged in any activity which 
may result in the discharge or runoff of pollutants" to comply with appli-
cable water quality standards."91 From this language, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that "[s]ection [313] plainly applies to nonpoint sources of pol-
lution on federalland."92 
Like section 401, section 313 also originated in section 21 of the Wa-
ter Quality Improvement Act of 1970.93 Before 1972, section 313 used the 
"any discharge" language found in section 401 today. In 1972, Congress 
amended 313 by changing "any discharge" to "discharge or runoff of pol-
lutants," thus mandating that section 313 apply to both point and nonpoint 
source pollution. If Congress had intended section 401 to regulate 
nonpoint source pollution it would have also have changed "any dis-
charge" to "discharge or runoff of pollutants." Instead, section 401 re-
tained the "any discharge" language, and other parts of its language were 
amended to clarify that section 401 only applied to point source pollu-
tion.94 
The 1972 amendment of section 401 reflected the shifting focus from 
water quality standards to controlling discharges from point sources.95 
When enacted in 1970, section 401 required state certification "that a li-
censed activity would 'not violate applicable water quality standards.' "96 
After 1972, section 401 required state certification that licensed activities 
"will comply with applicable provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 
1316, and 1317 of [Title 33]."97 Each of these sections cross referenced in 
section 401 regulate point source pollution.98 Thus, the 1972 amendment 
of section 401 was "to assure consistency with the bill's changed emphasis 
from water quality standards to effluent limitations based on the elimina-
tion of any discharge of pollutants."99 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58. 
91. ONDA. 1998 WL407711 at *6 (quoting 33 U.S.C. §1323(a)) (1994) (emphasis added). 
92. ONDA. 1998 WL 407711 at *6. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
93. Pub. L. 91-224, §21(a)-(b), 84 Stat. 91 (1970). 
94. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *6. 
95. See supra notes 45-4 7 and accompanying text. 
96. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *5 (quoting Pub.L. 91-224, § 2l(b)(l), 84 Stat. 91 (1970)). 
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(l) (1994). 
98. The Appellees content that section 1313 regulates nonpoint source pollution because it 
require states to implement state water quality plans. In its original opinion, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument on the basis that section 1313 was a supplemental regulation of point sources when 
multiple point source dischargers, who where within permit limitations, caused water quality to fall 
below set health standards. See ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *5. 
99. ONDA, 1998 WL 407711 at *5 (quoting S.Rep. No. 414, at 69 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3735). 
404 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 13 
b. The legislative history of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 
is not indicative of Congressional intent for the 1972 Amendments. 
Relying on legislative history from of the Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970, the district court concluded that Congress intended for sec-
tion 401 to be used to control nonpoint sources of pollution which was 
causing significant impacts on the quality of the nation's water. 100 What 
the district court failed to recognize, however, was the drastic changes 
Congress made to the CW A in 1972. 
The amendments of 1972 changed the focus and structure of the 
CW A, carefully drawing distinctions between pollution from point sources 
and nonpoint sources. 101 These distinctions have created a regime where 
point source pollution is strictly regulated and nonpoint sources have been 
left virtually unregulated. In essence, Congress decided to focus the regu-
latory effort on controlling sources of pollution that where identifiable and 
easy to correct. 102 
After the 1972 amendments, the WQIA was completely overhauled 
and became the CW A. These extensive revisions negated the relevancy of 
legislative history prior to the discussion of the current scheme of regula-
tion. In light of the 1972 amendments, the district court's reliance on 1970 
legislative history was erroneous. 
c. Twenty-seven years of Congressional acquiescence. 
Although Congressional acquiescence is not always demonstrative of 
Congressional intent, it tends to show that Congress approves of the way a 
statute is being interpreted. Congress has amended the CW A several times 
since 1972, "focusing on nonpoint source pollution in 1987." 103 Even so, 
Congress "has never amended section 401 to correct or clarify how it was 
being applied by states, courts and federal agencies." 104 During that time, 
parties seeking grazing permits have never been required to obtain certifi-
cation from the state. The fact that Congress has not, during those twenty-
seven years, corrected the agencies' interpretation, supports the argument 
that Congress never intended section 401 to require certification of 
nonpoint sources. 
100. See ONDA, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). 
101 See supra notes 7-18 and accompanying text. 
102. See ONDA. 1998 WL 407711 at *4. 
103. Miles, supra note 2, at 223. 
104. !d. 
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2. Applying section 401 to permits or licences that "may" release 
nonpoint pollution would result in absurd results 
405 
Construing a statute for purposes not intended by Congress not only 
bypasses the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, but may lead to 
absurd results. Under the district court's reading of section 401, certifica-
tion would be required for all permits or licences that "may result in any 
discharge[s]."105 This is a massive expansion of section 401 's scope. Per-
mits to camp in a national park, or hike through a national forest, 106 or raft 
a river through federal lands would require section 401 certification "to the 
extent that waste products, including human waste, may enter into waters 
or there are possible increases in sedimentation or temperature." 107 The 
Forest Service also pointed out that "even revegetation activities might 
require prior state certification if they 'may result' in attracting animals 
that would predictably cross water and deposit sediments or wastes." 108 
Almost any activity could conceivably cause an increase in nonpoint 
source pollution. If the term" discharge" is interpreted to include nonpoint 
sources, this absurd result cannot be avoided because the language is clear 
that "any activity ... which may result in any discharge"109 requires state 
certification or a waiver from the state. There is no provision that activities 
that cause slight discharges can be excluded. 110 Thus, the district court's 
ruling would require Federal agencies to ask the state for permission be-
fore it carried out any activity on the Federal lands. It is unlikely that Con-
gress intended for states to have this much control over what activities take 
place on Federal lands. 111 
105. 33 U.S.C ~ 134l(a)(l) (1994). 
106. The Forest Service recently announced a new program for the Mt. Hood National Forest 
and other national forests in Oregon and Washington whereby hikers would have to purchase 
trailhead permits before hiking forest trails. Presumably such permits fall within the district court's 
interpretation of section 40 I and may therefore require section 40 I certification. Brief for Appellant 
at 24 n.l3, ONDA v. Dombeck No. 97-35065, 97-35112, 1998 WL 407711 (9th Cir.) (No. 97-
35115). 
107. /d. at 16. 
108. !d. at 16-17. 
109. 33 U S.C ~ 134l(a)(l) (1994). 
110. 33 U S.C § 1341 (1994). 
Ill. See Alexander H. Southwell, The County Supremacy Movement: The Federalism 
Implications of' a 1990's State's Rights Battle 32 GONZ. L REV. 417 (1996-97); Sally Fairfax & 
Richard Cowart, Judicial Nationalism vs. Dual Regulation on Public Lands: Granite Rocks Uneasy 
Compromises, 17 ENVTL L REP. 10276 (1987). 
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3. Section 401 may not be an effective tool to curtail nonpoint source 
pollution because many states lack the resources and the incentives 
to implement meaningful certification programs 
Oregon did not bring this lawsuit, nor did it join as a plaintiff in this 
case. ONDA brought the case hoping that Oregon would be willing to pick 
up the ball and require meaningful certification that would abate the 
nonpoint source pollution caused by grazing. This type of voluntary state 
involvement in controlling nonpoint pollution was included in section 208 
and 319 of the CW A. After spending more than two decades attempting to 
curb nonpoint pollution under this regime, nonpoint pollution continues to 
be the leading cause of water quality degradation. 112 This result stems from 
the fact that many states lack the resources and the incentives to effectively 
regulate the land uses that cause severe nonpoint source pollution. 113 
Responding to the district court's ruling, the Oregon Department of 
Environmental Quality and the Oregon Department of Agriculture promul-
gated rules to streamline the process of issuing section 401 certifications. 114 
This streamline method adopted Best Management Practices that the U.S. 
Forest Service had already agreed to incorporate into grazing permits is-
sued in Oregon. 115 These actions demonstrate that Oregon's response was 
concerned more with maintaining the status quo with as little paperwork as 
possible. 116 The result was an increase in paper work with no reduction in 
nonpoint source pollution. Even obtaining waivers from the state would 
use up both state and federal agency resources that could be put to better 
use. This type of paper shuffling is not only useless but detrimental be-
cause it ties up agency resources and may delay the implementation of 
methods that would actually reduce nonpoint source pollution. 
If the district court's ruling where upheld, some states would imple-
ment a certification program that would reduce nonpoint source pollution. 
The majority, as history has shown, would either waive the certification or 
implement a weak certification program that would have little effect on 
point source pollution. This failure would be the result of inadequate fund-
ing, overriding local interests, and a lack of ambition to fulfill somebody 
else's goals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit should stick with their first impressions of this case 
and not allow section 401 certification for nonpoint source pollution. This 
112. NWQI at ES-14-ES-17. 
113. See Miles. supra note 2 at 228-231. 
114. Miles. supra note 2 at 231. 
115. /d. 
116. /d. at231. 
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major environmental problem will not be cured by trying to make a square 
peg, nonpoint source pollution, fit into the round hole of section 401. Nor 
will this problem be solved by adopting regulation methods that history 
has proven to be ineffective. Although section 401 is not the solution, 
surely a better solution will be found because nonpoint source pollution is 
too great of a problem for Congress and the citizens of the United States to 
ignore. 117 
Daryl G. Ward 
117. What this better solution must include is beyond the scope of this case note. For further 
discussion see David Zaring, Axriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Rexulatory Control: The 
Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENTVL. L REV. 515 (1996). 
